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John Broome’s book Climate Matters (2012) is a lucid and instructive discussion of a 
number of ethical questions about how we must respond to climate change. In this 
paper, I examine his discussion of how the effects on future people of climate 
policies should bear on government decisions about whether to adopt those 
policies. In brief, Broome argues that the future effects of a government’s climate 
policies are a matter of indifference as far as justice is concerned. These future 
effects are of relevance only because, and insofar as, governments have weaker 
duties of goodness (or beneficence). I argue that this position does not give 
sufficient importance to the future effects of climate policy. To rectify this position, I 
propose that we endorse a third type of duty that has implications for climate policy. 
This third duty is not directed at particular future individuals (as duties of justice are) 
and neither is it directed at the producing as much impersonal good as possible (as 
duties of goodness are). Instead it requires that governments respect the intrinsic 
value of human life. 
 
1. Two key contentions  
Let me begin by identifying two key contentions that shape Broome’s discussion of 
the relevance of the effects on future people of climate policy for the government’s 
obligations. By “climate policy” I have in mind a type of policy that aims to prevent 
harm that arises from human-induced alterations to the Earth’s climate. Such a 
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policy might aim to do this by reducing the amount of greenhouse gases that are 
emitted into the atmosphere. Alternatively, it might do this by helping people, as 
well natural environments, to adapt to a changing climate. 
Broome’s first contention is about how the government should resolve 
conflicts between two types of moral duty he distinguishes, both of which have 
implications for climate policy. These are the duty of goodness and the duty of 
justice. Duties of goodness are duties to improve the world – to bring more of 
what’s good into the world. Duties of justice, by contrast, are owed “to another 
particular person, or to other particular people” (2012: 52). Unlike duties of 
goodness, duties of justice always correspond to rights held by particular individuals.  
Sometimes duties of justice and duties of goodness conflict: an action that 
would improve the world may also violate a person’s right. When this happens, 
“justice most often wins. Morality does not normally permit you to act unjustly even 
for the sake of the greater good” (2012: 53). Duties of justice don’t always win. 
There can be exceptions in which the amount of good at stake is so great that our 
decision should tip in favor of bringing about the most good, even if this involves 
violating someone’s right. But in such cases, we should at least be prepared to 
compensate the person whose right is violated. 
The second contention Broome makes is that duties of justice don’t apply to 
government decisions that affect the identities of people. By government decisions 
that “affect the identities of people”, I mean decisions that contribute to causing 
different people to exist than would have existed had an alternative decision been 
made. Broome believes that if all the people who would exist as a result of one 
 3
decision are different from the people who would exist as a result of another 
decision, then justice is silent about which of these two decisions the government 
should take. This is because people whose identities are affected by a government’s 
making one decision or the other have no interests or freedoms at stake in which of 
those decisions the government takes. If the government decides one way it will not 
cause anyone to experience less interest fulfilment or less freedom than that person 
would otherwise have experienced: those people simply would not have been born; 
they would not exist to have interests or freedoms, let alone to have them 
negatively affected. Having no interests or freedoms at stake in a government 
decision, identity-affected people can have no right that the government take one 
decision over the other. Which decision the government takes cannot, therefore, be 
a matter of justice.
1
 
Do climate policies affect the identities of future people? It depends on the 
extent of behaviour those policies affect. Take the example of a very widespread 
policy, say, a coordinated reduction of greenhouse gas emissions on the part of the 
US, EU, China, Japan and Russia. This policy would affect the behaviour of very many 
people. Some of this change in behaviour will ultimately affect who ends up 
procreating with whom. If it doesn’t affect that matter, it will almost certainly affect 
the moment in time when people procreate with each other. That moment needs 
only to be very slightly different in order for the child that emerges into the world to 
be different from the one that would otherwise have emerged (procreation just a 
few moments later results in the fusion of a different egg and sperm and hence a 
                                                          
1
 For the most influential discussion of the so-called “non-identity problem”, see 
Derek Parfit (1984: 351- 381). 
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different human being). With respect to some pairs of individuals, it may be the case 
that they would have procreated exactly at the same moment in time regardless of 
whether the mass-coordinated global policy of emission-reduction had taken place - 
but these non-identity-affected people would be few in number. 
Consider, by contrast, a very small-scale policy, say, the policy adopted by 
one individual to cycle to work, rather than drive a car. That policy will not affect the 
procreative behaviour of others, or, therefore, the identities of their future children. 
Because small-scale climate policies of that kind do not affect the identities of future 
people, the failure to adopt those policies can contribute to harming future people. 
Broome concludes that this means that, unlike governments, private individuals can 
have duties of justice towards future people. 
Although Broome believes that justice is indifferent with respect to the 
effects our large-scale climate policies have on the environment of identity-affected 
people, he doesn’t conclude that governments may disregard those effects in 
deliberating over which of those policies to implement. Paying serious attention to 
those effects is required by the duty of goodness. Indeed, he believes that 
governments are required to implement policies that reduce our aggregate GHG 
emissions on the ground that such policies will do very much more good than not 
implementing them. 
These two contentions, that duties of goodness are weaker than duties of 
justice, and that it is only duties of goodness that regulate identity-affecting policies, 
have a troubling implication. The next two sections explain that implication. The 
remainder of the paper then makes a suggestion: we should think about adding a 
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third contention to the two that Broome makes. The third contention is that there is 
a third type of duty – apart from duties of justice and duties of goodness – that gives 
the future effects of large-scale climate policies a different and intuitively more 
satisfactory kind of relevance for how governments should deliberate over those 
policies. This third duty is not directed at particular individuals, as duties of justice 
are, and neither does it tell us to promote the goodness of outcomes. Instead, it 
demands of us that we show concern for the intrinsic value of human life. Drawing 
on Ronald Dworkin’s reflections on the nature of that concern, I will attempt to 
explain the difference it makes to how climate matters for future people. 
 
2. Justice and goodness 
Broome’s two contentions have a troubling implication that he does not address for 
how governments should deliberate about climate policy. To see the implication I 
have in mind, we need to discuss the terms “justice” and “goodness” in a little more 
detail.  
Consider two cases in which Broome illustrates the relationship between the 
duties of justice and goodness. The first case is one in which goodness overrides 
justice: the government, Broome says, must build a motorway through someone’s 
farm, even though this violates a right of the farmer’s. That’s because there is a lot 
of good at stake for others. When this happens, Broome says, the government 
should compensate the farmer. The other case is one in which justice overrides 
goodness: a visitor to a hospital may not be killed so that a doctor can use his body 
parts to save five dying patients, even if doing this would bring about more good. 
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 What exactly is it that “goodness” refers to in the motorway case that 
overrides the farmer’s claims and that justifies building the motorway? One thing it 
might refer to is the quality of the state of affairs that is brought about if the 
motorway is built. What moves us to favor building the motorway, so one might 
think, is the fact that this realizes a better state of affairs than would otherwise be 
realized – better, say, because it contains a higher sum of utility, or because of some 
other factor that it contains apart from a high sum of utility, e.g. how that utility is 
distributed across persons. Let us call this kind of goodness, impersonal goodness.  
Notice, however, that there is a distinct consideration in favor of the 
motorists that we might be using the term “goodness” to label. This is the fact that 
the motorway will make many people better off than they would have been. I will 
call this distinct consideration, person-affecting improvement.
2
 Person-affecting 
improvement is distinct from impersonal goodness. That (a) there is more 
impersonal goodness in a state of affairs may be hold because (b) many people have 
been affected for the better in bringing about that state of affairs. But facts (a) and 
(b) are distinct from each other, and we can care about either fact independently of 
whether we care about the other. The difference between them is seen most easily 
                                                          
2
 Note that by a “person-affecting improvement” I have in mind improvement in the 
welfare of token individuals. Person-affecting improvement favours an outcome, 
then, only when a given person enjoys an increase in welfare than that same person 
enjoyed before. If, other things equal, a person in one outcome would enjoy more 
welfare than a different person would in another outcome, bringing about the 
former, rather than the latter, would not be a person-affecting improvement in my 
sense. 
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when we think about future people who depend for their identity on a decision we 
need to make. Suppose that, depending on what we decide, one set of future 
people will enjoy a higher level of aggregate utility than different set of future 
people. In that decision, there is no person-affecting improvement at stake (no 
token individual will be affected by that decision), but there is impersonal goodness 
at stake (assuming aggregate utility is impersonally good). 
 A point that will be important for my argument in what follows is that 
impersonal goodness and person-affecting improvement don’t have the same 
significance in our moral reasoning. Consider aggregate utility as an example of 
impersonal goodness. How much should the consideration that a state of affairs 
contains more aggregate utility than another state of affairs have in our moral 
reasoning? When contemplating the different (identity-affected) future populations 
we might help to bring about, I do not believe our attention is drawn so much to the 
aggregate utility in each of those populations. If each individual member of two 
entirely different, and differently-sized, future populations would have the same 
level of welfare, we wouldn’t necessarily think we should bring about the larger 
population just because it contained more aggregate utility, or, if we did think this, 
we wouldn’t give this consideration so much weight as to allow it to override the 
(non-negligible) interests of people living today. Or, consider distributive equality as 
another example of impersonal goodness: some people believe that the less 
inequality there is in the distribution of some significant good between people, the 
better a state of affairs. But most of those who believe this do not believe that we 
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should promote distributive equality by setting back some people’s (non-negligible) 
interests without benefiting others, i.e. by “levelling down”.  
By contrast, I believe we give a lot of weight to person-affecting 
improvement in our moral deliberations. The consideration that many people’s lives 
will go better seems to have far more weight in our deliberations over policy than 
any concern about impersonal goodness. For example, it is person-affecting 
improvement, not impersonal goodness, that makes us side with the motorists and 
against the farmer. 
So much for “goodness”. Consider next the meaning of the term “justice”. 
Earlier, we noted Broome’s contention that people whose identities are affected by 
a climate policy decision can have no right that the government adopt one climate 
policy or another. Broome does not explicitly supply the reason why a person cannot 
have a right against a decision that affects his identity, but I suggested the reason 
was this: a right exists only to protect an interest or freedom and a person has no 
interest or freedom at stake in a decision that affects his identity. Stated more 
generally, we could say that a person can only have a right against a decision if his 
interests are affected by that decision. The implication seems to be that “justice” 
regulates only person-affecting decisions (here I assume that “justice” refers only to 
duties that correlate with rights). 
But think again about the hospital case, in which justice prohibits killing a 
visitor so that a doctor can use his body parts to save five dying patients. Think, in 
particular, about why the hospital visitor has a right not to be killed by the doctor. It 
cannot be because he has a stronger interest at stake than any of the dying patients. 
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(We would think he has a right not to be killed even if his interest was only as strong, 
or even less strong, than theirs.) It is rather because he has a certain status – which 
all persons have – that bestows on him a right not to be harmed in terrible ways for 
the sake of others. Let me call this status, with slight inaccuracy, inviolability.
3
  
Consider now the fact that a person’s right to inviolability can be violated by 
actions that don’t affect that person’s interests. Imagine the following scenario: if a 
doctor presses a button, a machine will inseminate an egg with a sperm and 
simultaneously insert a code into the genetic material that will guarantee that that 
newly created human will die of a heart attack at age 40.
4
 This will enable the doctor 
eventually to use his organs to save other people’s lives. If the doctor presses the 
button, this human will have a life worth living and if not, he will not exist. So, if the 
doctor presses the button he won’t affect the interests of the newly created human. 
Still, I think most people would say that the doctor may not do this because of the 
inviolability of the human being he would be creating. That human being has a 
strong right against being used as a means to others' ends, even if he has no 
interests at stake. 
The conclusion we should draw from that example is that “justice” is 
ambiguous. For the sake of clarity, we should mean by it one of or another of the 
following two things. Either we can stipulate that “justice” applies both to person-
affecting decisions and to non-person-affecting decisions, where the latter category 
                                                          
3
 “Inviolability” normally refers to a right not to be subjected to a destructive attack 
simpliciter (Kamm 2001: 225), rather than to what I am using it to refer to here, 
namely, a right not to be subjected to a destructive attack for the sake of others. 
4
 This scenario is explored in Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel, Never Let me Go. 
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includes decisions about whether to breach inviolability, or we can stipulate that 
“justice” applies only to person-affecting decisions and then reserve a space within 
our moral vocabulary for a third type of duty which, like “justice”, is goodness-
overriding and owed to individuals, and which includes the duty not to breach 
inviolability. Because it gives us a more fine-grained vocabulary, I will adopt the 
second stance. Later, I suggest a version of the third type of duty.
5
 
For now, I want to make another point about “justice”. Consider again the 
motorway case. Presumably, if “justice” is on the side of the farmer, it is referring to 
a right other than the right of inviolability. (I assume that the farmer’s right of 
inviolability does not extend beyond his body, to his property). To what 
consideration other than inviolability does it refer? The only possibility I can think of 
is that it refers to a right a person has to having his interest fulfilled when it is 
weightier than any other individual interest with which it might happen to conflict. 
The farmer’s interest in retaining his farm – or, stated more abstractly, a person’s 
interest in the stability of an important possession - is graver - or so, at least, we 
might be presuming – than the interest each motorist has in speeding along the 
                                                          
5
 Notice that I am not arguing for the existence of a third type of duty by definitional 
fiat. I believe there exist weighty, non-person-affecting considerations that are 
distinct from impersonal goodness, considerations that have implications for large-
scale climate policy. I could make that point using a two-duty vocabulary, by saying 
that “justice” refers, among other things, to the non-person-affecting considerations 
I am trying to identify; but I think we are less likely to become confused if we say 
that “justice” refers only to person-affecting considerations and then categorize the 
duty to attend to the non-person-affecting considerations that I want identify as a 
third type of duty. 
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motorway. That is what we might mean when we say “justice” comes down on the 
farmer’s side. The point I want to make is that when that is what “justice” refers to, 
we believe justice is much more susceptible to being overridden by person-affecting 
improvement than when “justice” refers to the right of inviolability (as it does in the 
hospital case). 
 
3. A troubling implication 
These points about the meanings of “goodness” and “justice” help me state a worry 
about the implications of Broome’s view. To see the problem, it is helpful to first ask 
ourselves a hypothetical question. Assuming we have duties only of goodness and 
justice, which climate policies should we adopt if our decision were to have an 
impact only on people whose identities are not affected by climate policies? To 
make it easier to discuss this, let me assume that the only people whose identities 
are not affected by climate policies are currently alive people.  
I believe that the answer to this hypothetical question might well be that we 
would have to adopt climate policies that allow GHG emissions to continue 
undiminished. It is of course true that this would set back the interests of many 
currently alive people who live in some of the poorest parts of the world: they will 
suffer the damaging consequences of climactic changes, such as flooding, for 
example. But climate policies that require a reduction in emissions will also set back 
the interests of many other people in some of the poorest parts of the world. Due to 
the negative economic effects of these climate policies, many people will earn less 
income, or will lose their jobs, or will not be offered jobs to begin with, and many of 
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them live in deep poverty, for example, in rural areas in China and India. Climate 
policies will deprive them of very significant benefits. Those who would suffer the 
climactic consequences of undiminished emissions may have graver interests at 
stake than those who forgo economic benefits as a result of policies that require a 
reduction in emissions. (Dying from flooding, after all, is worse than living in deep 
poverty, to put it crudely.) But this would not necessarily mean that we should 
adopt policies that reduce emissions If, as the motorway case shows, we can have 
reason to side with goodness (as person-affecting improvement), and against justice 
(as fulfilment of the graver interest), that conclusion would be premature.
6
 For it 
might be the case that the amount of person-affecting improvement that would be 
forgone by reducing GHG emissions is so great as to justify overriding the graver 
interests of those who would suffer as a result of those emissions (though they 
would have to be compensated to the extent that this is possible
7
). That this might 
be the case is suggested, in particular, by the following fact. 
                                                          
6
 Note that we can't appeal to the consideration that favors the hospital visitor in 
order to reject undiminished emissions. Undiminished emissions will harm many 
amongst the currently alive, but those emissions do not violate their rights of 
inviolability. It distorts the truth to say that the victims of emissions are being used 
as means for the sake of others. 
7
People who die as a result of human-induced climate change cannot be 
compensated; one might think that this is a decisive reason against permitting 
emissions to continue undiminished. But I don’t think it is. There are many 
reasonable, large-scale policies that we implement for the sake of person-affecting 
improvement that we know will cause or allow some people to die: we build 
motorways and railroads; national health care systems divert resources away from 
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The setbacks to people’s interests that will occur as a result of policies that 
require a reduction in emissions will materialize fairly soon. For example, people in 
China or India who rely on working in exporting industries would have less work 
available to them, and this would happen more or less immediately after the 
implementation of climate policies. By contrast, the harms that current emissions 
will bring about will materialize much later. This is in large part due to the so-called 
“thermal inertia of the oceans”, i.e. the fact that increases in air temperature take 
time to heat up the oceans. As Davidson writes, “Because of the thermal inertia of 
the oceans, it takes about 50-100 years before the climate responds to changes in 
the oceans” (2008: 471). The response may come sooner than that, but not much 
sooner.
8
 By the time the harms caused by current emissions materialise, many 
people who are currently alive will be dead. This means that the group of currently 
alive people who are negatively affected by emissions is likely to be much smaller 
than the group of currently alive people who are negatively affected by policies that 
require a reduction of emissions. If we consider the impact of our climate policy 
                                                                                                                                                                     
marginal improvements in curing fatal disease, towards conditions that aren’t life-
threatening. In these cases and others we do not regard the uncompensated deaths 
of some as a decisive reason against proceeding with policy. So it is not obvious why 
we should adopt that stance in the case of large-scale climate policy. 
8 According to Hansen (2005: 1), “25-50 years are needed for Earth’s surface 
temperature to reach 60 percent of its equilibrium response” to so-called “climate 
forcings”, i.e. “changes in the planet’s energy balance that tend to alter global 
temperature.” So the “climate lag” may be shorter than the 50-100 year period that 
Davidson mentions, but not much shorter. 
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decision-making on currently alive people alone, it is therefore not obvious that we 
should implement policies that reduce GHG emissions. 
The worrying implication of Broome’s view is that it doesn’t give us reason to 
depart from that answer once we also take into account the future effects of climate 
policy. Broome wouldn’t be able to respond to undiminished emissions by invoking 
the beneficial future effects of reducing GHG emissions. “If we reduce GHG 
emissions,” so one might think, “then, as well as protecting current people from 
harm, we promote goodness in the future.” True, but the goodness at stake in the 
future is not goodness as person-affecting improvement, that overrode the farmer’s 
interests (or, to stick with the current case, that might override the interests of poor 
people today who would have to forgo economic development). Future goodness 
(given that it is identity-affected) is the other kind of goodness, namely, impersonal 
goodness. As we noted earlier, however, impersonal goodness is a weak 
consideration in our moral deliberations (see p. 7 above), and one we normally 
dismiss when it comes at the expense of some people’s (non-negligible) interests.  
 
 
Could climate policy protect future people against harm? 
One may think the following response is available to Broome. It builds on his claim 
that private individuals do indeed harm future individuals when they emit GHGs in 
their small-scale policies (see p. 4 above). In particular, consider a climate policy that 
takes the form of forcing private individuals to adopt small-scale policies to reduce 
their emissions, for example, by imposing strict penalties on private individuals who 
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pollute above the level of their emissions permits. Such a policy prevents present 
private people from harming future people. Wouldn’t that mean that it protects 
future people against harm? If so, Broome can rely on the duty of justice in order to 
argue against undiminished emissions. 
This line of argument fails. It’s true that if climate policy prevented a few 
private individuals from emitting beyond a certain amount, then that policy would 
prevent those individuals from harming future persons. But the kind of climate 
policy we are hoping to justify will regulate and affect the behaviour of many 
present private individuals. The overall effect that policy will have on the identities 
of future persons will therefore be great. Hence that climate policy will not protect 
future people against harm. 
That reasoning might seem a little quick. In the absence of large-scale 
climate policy, it is a fact (a) that private individuals will harm future individuals 
through their emissions. If a large-scale climate policy that is aimed at stopping this 
were effectively implemented, then fact (a) this stops being a fact. Shouldn’t we 
then conclude that large-scale climate policy prevents future individuals from being 
harmed? 
  No we should not. Large-scale climate policy prevents present people from 
harming future people. But it doesn’t protect future people from being harmed by 
present people. That sounds a bit odd, but it’s true. Large-scale climate policy would 
ensure that present individuals don’t harm future people but only by altering the 
identities of the future persons who are affected by present individuals. Preventing 
present people from harming future people in that way doesn’t protect future 
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people from harm. Preventing A from emitting will only protect B in the future from 
harm, if the act of preventing A from emitting leaves B in the future intact. If 
preventing A from emitting ensures that C exists instead of B in the future, then B is 
neither harmed nor protected from harm. So, in the final analysis, we have to 
conclude that large-scale climate policies will not protect future people against 
harm. Justice remains indifferent about the negative future effects of large-scale 
climate policy decisions. 
 
4. The value of human life  
So far I have argued that Broome’s two main contentions fail to give enough weight 
to the interests of identify-affected people in the future (at least if we assume we 
should adopt a climate policy that substantially reduces the current level of 
emissions). There may be alternative interpretations of justice and goodness that 
could allow us to give those interests sufficient weight.
9
 My aim is not to discuss the 
merits of these alternative interpretations, or to suggest a superior argument for 
how we might justify assigning strong moral weight to the interests of future people. 
Rather, I want to show that we can benefit from expanding the moral resources 
beyond those that Broome works in Climate Matters when thinking about the 
ethical challenges posed by climate change. Specifically, I think we should add and 
appeal to a third category of moral duty, apart from those of justice and goodness, 
when thinking about the ethics of climate change. 
                                                          
9
 For an argument that appeals to impersonal goodness, see Mulgan (2006). For an 
argument that appeals to person-affecting considerations, see Kumar (2003).  
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To begin with, recall what the duty of goodness involves. When Broome 
describes the duty of goodness, he describes it as a duty aimed at bringing about 
something, namely, a better world. The duty of goodness, he says, tells you to give 
some of your money to people who are poorer than you, because: “On balance the 
world is made better by the donation. For that reason, morality requires it.” And, as 
well as requiring you to do this as a private individual, “[m]orality also requires 
governments to make the world better” (2012: 51). The key feature of the duty of 
goodness is that it requires us to act in certain ways because of the quality of the 
state of affairs that this action brings about. It is because “the world is made better” 
that the duty of goodness requires that we give money to poorer people. 
Now, as several writers have pointed out, that we must produce a state of 
affairs of a given kind is not only the kind of action that “goodness” can require of 
us. We needn’t believe that goodness can capture our moral attention in that way 
only. Take, for example, the goodness many see in the ancient Cedar trees of 
Lebanon: that they are good does not seem to imply that we should plant their 
seeds across the face of the Earth, but calls for a distinct kind of action, namely, that 
we preserve those of them there are.
10
  
I want to suggest that the value of human life similarly grounds a duty that is 
different in kind from duties of goodness and duties of justice. Furthermore, I 
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 As Scanlon writes (1998: 88): “When we consider the things that are generally 
held to be intrinsically valuable…it becomes apparent that in most cases taking them 
to be valuable is not simply, or even primarily, a matter of thinking that certain 
states of the universe are better than others and are therefore to be promoted.”  
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believe that that distinct duty has important implications for climate policy. Let me 
give an example that suggests the duty I have in mind, before trying to be more  
explicit. 
Suppose that a person is born and brought up in a cellar and still finds 
himself there now, after many years. He has very limited space to move around in, 
and a very limited number of objects to interact with. But food is thrown down to 
him every day, and so, he is able to continue living his life. That’s a terrible situation. 
The words that come closest to helping me say what I find so horrible about it is the 
extreme frustration of the capacity this person has to make something of his life. I 
would prefer it if there had instead been a rat running around in the cellar, that 
could gnaw at the few objects and eat the food thrown its way. 
Suppose now that this person in the cellar will come into existence in the 
future unless we decide otherwise, in which case a different person would exist who 
would live in a house with a garden, with more objects, and also other people, to 
interact with. Suppose our decision about this will make no difference to anyone or 
anything else. Would it be wrong if we still decided to bring about the person in the 
cellar? I think so.  
What does that show? It doesn't show conclusively that the duty of goodness 
and duty of justice fail to exhaust our duties. Presumably, the cellar is a less valuable 
state of affairs than the house and garden, so the duty of goodness can explain why 
we should bring about the house and garden instead of the cellar. But imagine now 
that the choice we face is between one house and garden, and a thousand cellars, 
each with a small amount of good in it that together add up to more in total than 
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the good that would occur in the one house and garden. If all we had to do was 
promote goodness, we should bring about the thousand cellars.
11
 But surely that 
would be wrong. 
Maybe we could describe the duty of goodness in a way that would allow us 
to get the right result. I’ve been implicitly assuming that the value of a state of 
affairs depends on the amount of aggregate amount of utility it contains. But we 
could think that the value of a state of affairs depends on how much it contains of 
something else, which we could vaguely call “the realization of human potential.” 
We could think a state of affairs is more valuable the more of that kind of realization 
it contains, and we could add a lot of weight to differences in that kind of realization 
– so much so, that the existence of one life that is more realized in the house and 
garden contributes more in that utility calculation than the existence of the far less 
realized lives in the thousand cellars.
12
 
But even when described in that way, the duty of goodness doesn’t seem to 
generate the right result. Suppose we could  choose between creating (a) a state of 
affairs with one person in a house and garden and (b) a state of affairs in which 
there are two houses and gardens, each with one person in them (assume that the 
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 This widely discussed implication of the duty of goodness is standardly referred to 
as the “repugnant conclusion”. See Parfit (1984: 388).  
12
 This response to the worry that the duty of goodness entails the repugnant 
conclusion is a version of what Parfit calls “the Lexical View” (referring to the fact 
that the importance of bringing about some goods lexically overrides aggregate 
utility – the lexically more important good in our current case is “the realization of 
human potential”). See Parfit (1984: 414). 
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two persons in this second outcome are each able to realize their lives to the same 
extent as one would be if he existed on his own). If we believed in the revised 
version of the duty of goodness just described, we should think (b) is the obviously 
correct choice. But I see nothing wrong with choosing (a). 
 So I think the example does show that our duties are not exhausted by the 
duty of justice and duty of goodness. What it suggests is that if the future will 
contain the kind of potential that a human life is, then we need to care about the 
environment in which that life will be lived, not because the realization of that 
potential contributes to a state of affairs we should bring about but because it is 




Beyond thingness and inviolability 
To elaborate on the duty to care about the value of human life, let me describe two 
restrictions on how we might describe that duty that I think we should avoid. The 
two restrictions are interrelated. The most important restriction is in the scope of 
what “human life” refers to. One might think “human life” refers to a particular kind 
of thing – say an entity with a particular biological structure, or a person. But 
“human life” can also refer to something less tangible, like a process, or a story, or, 
more specifically, as Dworkin suggests, to a response on the part of a person to an 
opportunity: “The nerve of the sacred,” – the “sacred” being Dworkin’s term for the 
kind of intrinsic value possessed by human life – “lies in the value we attach to a 
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process or enterprise or project rather than to its results considered independently 
of how they were produced” (1993: 78).
13
 (We should note that “human life” can 
also be intrinsically valuable when it is understood as a particular thing or person: 
my point is only that that is not the only way in which human life has a value that 
can ground a third type of duty.) 
Dworkin observes that our reactions to the end of another person’s life are 
strongly affected by how old that person was when he or she died (1993: 86-7). We 
generally find it much worse for the life of a teenager to end than for the life of a 
very early fetus or for a very old person to end. The greater awfulness of the end of 
a teenager’s life suggests that the value of “human life” refers not only to a 
biological entity or a person: an old person is no less a person than a teenager and a 
fetus is no less biologically human than a teenager and old person. The greater 
awfulness of a teenager’s death is due, Dworkin believes, to the fact that this person 
has started to invest in her life and yet has still not been able to see the fruits of that 
investment. No such investment has occurred, by contrast, in the life of an early 
fetus, and much of it has been redeemed in the life of an old person, many of whose 
plans have at least partially reached their objective.  
 Does the value of human life, when interpreted as a response to an 
opportunity, establish a duty on the part of others that is different from the duty of 
goodness? Consider the man in the cellar. What disturbed me about his case was 
                                                          
13
 Richard Wollheim gives a fine statement of the multiple meanings of “human life” 
(1986: 2): “There are persons, they exist; persons lead lives, they live; and as a 
result, in consequence – in consequence, that is, of the way they do it – there are 
lives. So there is a thing, and there is a process, and there is a product.”  
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the extreme restriction his environment places on his ability to respond to the 
opportunity of life. We have strong reasons not to bring about a life that can be 
responded to so poorly. But this talk of our having to avoid bringing about a poor 
response to a life might suggest that there is something that we must seek to 
promote more of, rather than less. Should I not then describe the kind of action that 
the value of human life demands of us as an act of promoting something? 
Yes I should, but that does not necessarily mean that it is a duty of goodness. 
A duty of goodness tells us to promote something because that thing contributes to 
a valuable state of affairs. If our duty to enable people to respond well to the 
opportunity of life took that form, it would be a duty that is ultimately grounded in 
the fact that the world should contain more well-responded-to-opportunities. But 
we can think of our duty to enable people to respond well to the opportunity of life 
differently. We can believe that it is just bad in itself (i.e. independently of its 
contributory effect on a state of affairs) that the opportunity that a human life 
represents is not responded to well and that it is just good in itself that it is.
14
 That 
intrinsic badness or goodness can ground a duty on our part not to bring about an 
environment in which only a poor response to life can be made. 
A second, related restriction we should avoid when thinking about the value 
of human life concerns the actions that the value of human life requires of us. We 
should not think that these actions are restricted to respect for inviolability (by 
                                                          
14
 As Dworkin puts it (2004: 370), “once a human life has begun it is important that it 
go well. That does not entail, nor do I believe, that the more lives that go well the 
better.”  
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which I mean a right not to be harmed for the sake of others). One might be 
tempted into having that thought if one thinks of human life in “thing-like” terms, on 
the model, say, of a classic painting or Cedar tree. It might prompt one to think of 
the value of human life as consisting in the continued existence of a valuable entity, 
and hence of the treatment it demands as involving something akin to respect for 
inviolability. But if human life could refer also to something “un-thing-like”, such as a 
response to an opportunity, then it is easier to appreciate that respect for 
inviolability is not the only kind of treatment that the value of human life might 
demand of us. It might demand of us a far more general category of treatment that 
involves how we act or not act upon the circumstances that influence a person’s 
capacity to respond well to the opportunity of having a life. 
That is a very vague statement about the treatment that the value of human 
life makes us duty-bound to give others. But I only want to maintain the following 
two points, which do not depend on a detailed view about that matter. First, on any 
plausible account of what enabling others to respond well to the opportunity of a 
life involves, the impact our actions have on the natural environment in which they 
live will have great moral importance. A person’s ability to pursue almost any 
reasonable plan of life is vulnerable to his or her natural environment. Secondly, the 
ability to respond well to the opportunity of a life on the part of people in the future 
is as deserving of our care as is that same ability on the part of currently alive 
people. The intrinsic value of human life in the future does not demand lesser duties 
of us than the intrinsic value of human life today. The overall implication is a 
principle of equality that has significance for climate policy: we must assign the 
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same moral importance to how our policies affect people’s ability to respond to the 
opportunity of having a life regardless of when they exist.  
 
4. Back to the future  
Let me return to my concern about the implications of Broome’s two contentions for 
climate policy. I was worried that if we focus exclusively on duties of justice and 
goodness, then we cannot assign the right kind of relevance to the future effects of 
our climate policy choices. We assign inferior moral importance to the effects of 
climate policies on future people than on people who are currently alive. The 
question is whether appealing to the duty to care about the value of human life 
helps us to assign a different, intuitively more satisfactory relevance to the effects of 
climate policy on future people.  
Now, even if a third duty of this sort existed, that does not necessarily mean 
that we escape the worry I said applied to Broome’s view. If we want to justify 
climate policies that require a reduction of emissions today for the sake of people in 
the future, we need to show that the third duty is weighty enough to outweigh the 
interests of those who will be worse off today as a result of emissions reductions. 
Just as person-affecting improvement might outweigh the farmer’s claim of justice, 
it might outweigh, also, the third duty that demands equal treatment for future 
people. So we need to show that the third duty can override person-affecting 
improvement. 
 In order to illustrate the possibility that it can be intuitively more plausible to 
give the former more weight, consider the following, very simply example. In the 
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schema below, person A exists during times T1 and T2, and person B exists during T2 
and T3 in distribution I, and person C exists during T2 and T3 in distribution II. We 
need to decide which distribution we should bring about in the future, i.e. during 
times T2 and T3. Should we bring about I or II? 
 
Now   Future 
  T1   T2 T3 
A 8  I 6 - 
B -   2 2 
 
A 8  II 5 - 
C -   3 3 
 
Notice that opting for I rather than II makes A overall better off than A might have 
been (and affects no other person). So, person-affecting improvement tells us to opt 
for I. Furthermore, notice that the only kind of goodness that could justify our 
preference for II, is impersonal goodness (because II has more good in it and less 
inequality). Remember, however, that we don’t ordinarily believe that impersonal 
goodness trumps person-affecting improvement (see p. 7 above). Yet despite this, I 
submit that it seems most defensible to opt for II. So, something must be pulling us 
in that direction other than impersonal goodness, and it is something that (by itself 
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It may be that the third duty only pulls harder than person-affecting improvement 
when it pulls in conjunction with impersonal goodness (though I doubt it). This 
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 What’s pulling us to II, I suggest, is that II helps us avoid bringing about an 
outcome in which B will struggle to respond well to the opportunity of having a life. 
If we try to imagine the different ways that B’s life might be worse than C and A, we 
might picture something about B’s personal or external circumstances that prevents 
him from responding well to the opportunity of a life. Perhaps B lacks the 
psychological capacities necessary for creating stable and coherent aspirations in life 
or perhaps B lives in deep poverty. 
 The lesson I draw from the example is that our decisions about the kind of 
future we must try to bring about should not be governed only by what happens to 
currently alive persons (who are represented by A in the example) and to 
impersonal goodness. We must also care about the identity-affected people who 
will exist (represented by B and C). If there are going to be people with lives to lead, 
we have a strong reason to create a better, as opposed to a worse, environment for 
whoever they are. 
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